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GIFT OF



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Field Orders, Messages and Reports

By

Major Eben Swift

1896 (Revised)

Assistant Commandant, U. S. Staff College



Government Printing Office : Washington : 1906

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
Document No. 278.
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF.

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J. F.

TO THE
ATTENTION
OF THE

L.C.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 10, 1906.

A board of officers having recommended the authoritative publication by the War Department of a handbook entitled "Field Orders, Messages, and Reports," prepared by Major Eben Swift, Twelfth Cavalry, it is hereby adopted for the guidance of the Regular Army, and the organized militia of the United States.

WM. H. TAFT,
Secretary of War.

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FIELD ORDERS.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

1. It was supposed for a long time that the education of a soldier in time of peace must stop at the drill ground. Recent experience has dispelled that fallacy and taught us that most of the problems of war can be solved in time of peace. So well is this idea now established that a nation can not hope for success in war unless it has provided an elaborate system of peace training.

Among the important elements to be considered in time of peace are those which concern the leading of troops and the instruction of officers in issuing proper orders in the field. The drafting of orders has been so systematized that it has become a special art. It can only be learned by practice assisted by intelligence. Often those who have the best ideas are unable to convey them clearly in writing.

2. The earliest battles were merely collisions of armed mobs. The leaders exercised little influence upon the action except by personal example. In the course of time it was discovered that drill and discipline on one side or the other would neutralize the effect of individual courage and superiority in numbers of the enemy. Armies remained small and, although warfare was the favorite occupation of mankind, there were few great leaders and they made few improvements in their art. Occasionally some one acquired great success by seizing upon an apparently simple idea. A flank attack, a formed reserve, a rapid march, an ambuscade, or stratagem, sometimes a better weapon, sometimes a new maneuver at drill, was sufficient to make a reputation for a general, or even to change the course of history. But tactical results alone seem to have been sought, and the art of war was limited to the field of battle. In two thousand years it is hard to find cases where the terrain was considered in its relation to the campaign. It seems to have taken all this time to learn that an inferior army directed by a superior

intelligence could be maneuvered, out of sight of the battlefield, in such a way that victory was practically secured before the battle began. This was strategy, a word derived from the Greek word for general and first clearly understood by Napoleon Bonaparte. He revolutionized the art of war and overthrew with ease the army which at that day was the foremost example of all earlier systems.

3. In order to succeed, Napoleon had to depend upon the ability of his subordinates to carry out his plans. For this purpose it was his custom to furnish each with carefully worded orders, often in the minutest detail, and often attempting to provide for every contingency that might arise. He never succeeded, however, in reducing his orders to a system, as we shall see, and this often caused his plans to miscarry, and was an important element in bringing about his final defeat.

4. A few examples of Napoleon's orders will call attention to the defects of his system, and will show the causes of its failure. In the maneuvers prior to the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Marshals Davout and Bernadotte were detached to the Prussian rear at Naumberg and Dornberg, respectively. Each marshal was given a letter of instructions. In the instructions of Davout the following phrase occurred: "If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the place assigned him at Dornberg." In the instructions of Bernadotte this matter did not appear, and the marshal interpreted his orders to mean that he should go to Dornberg in any event, although he knew that he could not get there, and in fact he did not get there. Davout interpreted the order to mean that if Bernadotte had not already gone to Dornberg he should remain and march from Naumberg with the other command (Davout's). The result was that Davout was left to fight 60,000 of the enemy with less than half that force, while Bernadotte did not get into action at all. Instead of one of the most successful campaigns in history it might have been the opposite. It will be seen later how much better than such letters of instructions is the modern form of order which makes clear the spirit as well as the letter of the instructions.

5. At Bautzen Napoleon sent a brief pencil note to Ney, telling him to be at Prietitz by 11 o'clock and to attack the enemy's right. Ney arrived in position at 10 o'clock, when he could have attacked the enemy's rear and probably destroyed the allied armies. He would not attack until 11 o'clock, and insisted on attacking the enemy's right according to the letter of his instructions. Ney missed the entire object of the maneuver which he executed; but

his connection with the whole operation had not been explained to him, and the failure was a natural result of the system in use at that day.

6. At Wagram Napoleon's order for the passage of the Danube contained the error of assigning the right corps to the center bridge while the center corps was assigned to the right bridge. The result was a crossing of the lines of march, producing a dangerous confusion in the army. The order was quite long, containing 31 articles and more than 1,500 words. Many copies had to be made, as the practice was to distribute orders in this way rather than by detailing representatives of the various commands to go after them. It is easy to see how a word could have been put in the wrong place.

7. In the Waterloo campaign Napoleon dispatched Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussian army, which was beaten at Ligny. The written orders to Grouchy, differing materially from the verbal orders, contained the following words:

"It is important to find out what the enemy is intending to do; whether he is separating himself from the English or whether they are intending to unite to cover Brussels or (and) Liege in trying the fate of another battle."

It is now evident that Napoleon intended that Grouchy should interpose between himself and the Prussians, and that Grouchy so understood his duty, but it was not definitely ordered.

A library has been written on the subject of the Waterloo campaign, but the ablest military critics have not been able to see any particular significance in the words just quoted, or to indicate how they should have been obeyed. The apologists of Grouchy have found abundant material in the contradictory and indefinite character of his orders.

8. Our own military history, great as it has been, does not furnish us models to follow in this regard.

The inactivity of General Patterson in the first Bull Run campaign was largely due to indefinite orders.

In the Manassas campaign of 1862 the Confederates on several occasions at the beginning of the campaign lost brilliant opportunities on account of defective orders. On August 7 the faulty orders of Stonewall Jackson caused delays prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain and resulted in two days being taken to make the march of one day. Ewell's route was changed, but A. P. Hill was not notified, and this caused their lines of march to cross, so that one division made only 8 miles and the other 2 miles in an entire day. In this order no mention was made of supply trains, and they followed

the divisions in column of route instead of in rear, as was intended. These numerous faults in a well-planned maneuver probably saved the corps of Banks. Again, on August 17, Lee planned to attack the scattered forces of Pope from behind Clark's Mountain on the Rapidan, but he failed because of the faulty orders of Stuart, which were not sufficiently definite to bring up the cavalry to lead the advance.

Later in this same campaign Pope's numerous orders were seldom understood by his subordinates. His own position was not stated, and he could not be found at important times.

9. Strange ideas on the subject of military orders existed during the civil war among officers who represented the best-trained element of the Army. The orders at that time were often filled with insignificant details, useless suggestions, and unwarranted interference with subordinates.

The order for the advance of the Federal Army before the first Bull Run warned the Army that three things were not pardonable in any commander: First, to come upon a battery or breastwork without knowledge of its position; second, to be surprised; third, to fall back. This order, which directed a movement of more than 35,000 men, prescribed that advance guards, vedettes, and flankers were to be used. Brigades were told to sustain themselves as long as possible before asking help of others. It contained directions as to the manner of attacking a battery, and told how camp kettles and mess pans were to be carried. Although the command-camped at Centerville for about three days, the troops were not placed in position for their subsequent movements, and a force of 20,000 men was marched through what was practically a defile on the morning of July 21. The order required all the troops to be ready at about 2 a. m., placed those troops in front which had the shortest march, and necessarily caused a long delay.

10. The order of the Confederate commander for the attack on Grant's army at Pittsburg Landing required some hours for its preparation, and probably many more for its distribution, and now occupies about three pages in the Rebellion Records. It contained about 1,500 words. It reminded one major-general, who, by the way, was himself the author of a system of tactics, that he must "make a proper distribution of artillery along the line of battle, remembering that the rifled guns are of long range, and should be placed in commanding positions in rear of his infantry, to fire mainly upon reserves and the second line of the enemy, but occasionally will be directed on his batteries and heads of columns." Another major-general, a veteran who had served twenty-five years,

was told how to form his regiments into line but was permitted to place his artillery to suit himself, possibly in deference to the popular idea that his battery had saved the day at Buena Vista, fourteen years before. The order provided for a number of small detachments, for camp guards, for repair of bridges and roads, and closed with an appeal to the patriotism of the troops, and enjoined them to obey orders, not to waste ammunition, to fire slowly, selecting a mark, and to do much work with the bayonet.

This order was issued on the 3d of April, 1862, and directed a concentration of the army on the next day at Mickey's, 8 miles from Pittsburg Landing. The assembly did not take place until twenty-four hours after the appointed time. Delays were caused by the crossing of columns on the march, misunderstandings, failure to distribute the order until after the movement had begun, but mainly by the attempt to concentrate 40,000 men into a small space with a single outlet. The delay gave an opportunity to Buell to reenforce Grant's army.

Credit for the authorship of this order has been claimed by several, who evidently did not realize its defects. The author claimed that he had before him the orders issued by Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign.

11. At Frederick, Md., on September 13, 1862, at some time now unknown, but probably early in the forenoon, General McClellan came in possession of a copy of General Lee's orders, detailing all his plans for the capture of Harper's Ferry. At 6.20 p. m., McClellan sent a letter of instructions containing more than 550 words to a corps commander. He sent orders to other corps at 6.45, 8.45, 11.30, 1, and 9 o'clock. The failure to take advantage of Lee's situation at that time was largely due to slow methods and verbose orders.

12. At the battle of Chickamauga Gen. T. J. Wood received a brief order in writing from the commander in chief to "close up" his division "on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." Wood and Reynolds were in line of battle, with Brannan between them. The order was issued on the supposition that Brannan was not in line, and that there was a gap between the other two divisions. Wood literally obeyed the order by taking his command out of the line and marching past the rear of Brannan to Reynolds's right. In this way occurred the gap in the line into which Longstreet threw his entire command and defeated the Federal Army.

General Rosecrans severely censured Wood for obeying the order under the circumstances. Upon this mooted point much may be

said. The commander in chief should ordinarily send his orders through the corps commander. If he wants a line *prolonged* in a certain direction he should not use the words "close up" and "support" to express that meaning. The order as sent gave no idea of the general situation, no position of supporting troops, and no correct idea of the mission of General Wood—all of which are necessary when a man is expected to obey the spirit as well as the letter of an order, and all of which are distinctly provided for in the modern order.

13. As late as 1871 the orders of the French commanders show these same defects. Page after page of minute instructions were given, many of which were never obeyed. For instance, the "instructions" of General Chanzy, probably their best general, contain such an introduction as this:

"The enemy to-day attempted to force us from our position. He attacked in succession at Saint Laurent-des-Bois and in the direction of Poissy, Cravant, and Villorceau. From information received from prisoners we learn that Prince Charles with his entire army was engaged, together with a numerous artillery. Everywhere we have resisted with energy and good order and have remained in possession of the field after having inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy. All should be inspired by this new success and be filled with confidence thereby; we must keep our positions and continue to resist if the Germans make a new attack to-morrow."

And so on for four printed pages. Other paragraphs of the same order contain such instructions as "Cavalry shall be placed in such a way as to profit by occasions to fall upon the enemy." "Each division commander will point out precisely where his baggage will go in case of attack to-morrow." "All troops who were engaged to-day will have an extra ration of brandy." The order contains directions about reconnaissance to be made, a promise of additional liquor in case another action is fought, rations and ammunition to be provided, appointments of doctors and others, reports to be sent, and the like.

14. On August 13, 1870, Marshal Bazaine gave orders for retreat from Metz to the westward on the following day.

"The First and Third Cavalry Divisions will march off from their camps in the direction of Verdun, the First Division along the road from Gravelotte by Doncourt and Conflans, the Third along the road from Gravelotte by Mars-la-Tour. The Third and Fourth Corps will take the former, the Second and Sixth Corps the latter road; the guard will follow the Sixth Corps. The whole army will be ready to march by 5 a. m."

The army consisted of 135,000 men and would make a column nearly 70 miles long. The map shows that the march of the entire army between Gravelotte and Metz is limited to a single road. This order was one of the counts in the indictment against Bazaine. He and his chief of staff each tried to put the responsibility on the other. The marshal was sentenced to be shot.

15. The Germans took up the leading of troops where Napoleon left it, reduced it to a system, and thus made it possible to make combined movements give the best results. They also made it possible to regulate the movements of armies greater than ever before and using weapons of far greater range and power.

As an instance of a modern order, take the following, which was issued at 4.30 p. m. on August 12, 1870, from the general headquarters:

"So far as our intelligence enables us to judge, the enemy's main forces are in the act of retiring through Metz over the Moselle. His Majesty commands:

"The I. army to advance to-morrow, the 13th, toward the French Nied, main body on the line Les Etangs-Pange, and hold the railway station at Courcelles; cavalry to reconnoiter in the direction of Metz and cross the Moselle below it. The I. army will then cover the right flank of the II.

"The latter to march on the line Buchy-Château Salins, push its outposts to the Seille, and endeavor, if possible, to secure the passages of the River Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbach, etc.; cavalry to reconnoiter beyond the Moselle.

"The III. army to continue the advance towards the line Nancy-Lunéville.

"v. MOLTKE."

The battle of Colombey-Nouilly took place in two days and that of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour in four days, and the investment of Metz a few days later.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. *A military order* is the expression of the will of a chief conveyed to subordinates. The higher his position the more general in character will his orders be.

2. At the beginning of operations, and from time to time thereafter, the plans and intentions of the supreme authority will ordinarily be issued in the form of *letters of instruction*. They will regu-

late movements over a large area and during a considerable time. In this way General Grant, from his headquarters at City Point, directed a million of men over an area half as large as Europe. His letters and telegrams were of the most general character and prescribed little else than a general objective, namely, the hostile armies, and concert of action in attacking them.

3. It seems appropriate that directions from the headquarters of an army marching on several roads, covering the dispositions for several days at a time, should be issued in the same way, although no uniform practice has obtained. General Sherman's "orders" from the headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi in his marches from Chattanooga to Atlanta and beyond were almost too general to be called orders, although designated as such. Of the same character were the "circulars" issued by General Meade before the battle of Gettysburg.

4. Orders are classified as follows:

(a) *Ordinary orders.*—The orders for regiments and all larger commands, territorial and tactical, as well as for military posts and permanent camps, are denominated *general* or *special* orders, according to character. General orders are such as apply to a whole command, while special orders relate to individuals and matters not of general application.

Orders for smaller units or for small detachments are simply called "orders."

Each kind of orders is numbered in a single series, beginning with the year, or with the establishment or organization of a new command. Circulars, memoranda, and letters are sometimes rather loosely used in place of orders.

(b) *Field orders.*—For field service another class of orders is needed, which deal entirely with the tactical and strategical details incident to a state of war and the prospect of contact with the enemy. Orders of this kind are called "FIELD ORDERS," and are numbered serially for each command.

FIELD ORDERS IN DETAIL.

1.—THE PLAN OF THE ORDER.

1. Military history furnishes examples of two widely different plans of preparing field orders. Thus their idea may be—

First. To prescribe a definite line of conduct for a subordinate, both in the details of execution of a particular order and in all the emergencies which seem likely to arise.

• Second. To point out only the object to be gained, leaving the method to the judgment of those who are charged with the execution.

The *first* plan was followed by Napoleon and Wellington and many great commanders.

2. Napoleon particularly delighted in minute and voluminous instructions. He would detail the exact duties of every important commander, and would attempt to provide for every possible emergency. This was perhaps a necessary part of his system, for his marshals were not men of conspicuous ability, except as fighters, the best of them frequently failing him when removed from his personal direction. But his instructions were often so elaborate and voluminous that there was not time to study, digest, or learn them. Consequently many were neglected and ignored. In attempting to provide for every contingency it was impossible for him to foresee all emergencies, and thus unexpected conditions came about to which his orders were not applicable. His practice of providing for everything himself also worked to his disadvantage toward the close of his career, because he was no longer able to work for twenty hours a day. This is shown particularly by the failures or inability of his staff to assume the direction of events in his absence or when he was resting. His failure to follow up the victory of Dresden and permitting Vandamme's division to be destroyed at Culm can be explained in no other way. The same thing occurred at critical periods of the Waterloo campaign. His defeat at Leipsic was largely due to the failure of his staff to provide bridges for retreat across a river, a matter which he had expected them to attend to without orders.

3. The plan of Napoleon would not succeed in less skillful hands than his own. It has been superseded by a better and more logical system. What the ordinary mind foresees seldom comes to pass. Few, indeed, are able to look so far into the future as to provide for every emergency. It is impossible to tell where, in the wide range of military knowledge, it is expedient to begin and where to stop when once you begin to give details. Instances are known of elaborate plans of battle which were never carried out, because a single unexpected event occurred. Beauregard's order to turn the Federal left at Centerville was not executed, because the enemy made that identical movement against his own left at an earlier hour. A second order, issued later, also failed of execution, because it never reached the officer who was to begin the movement; no copy of the second order, it may be mentioned, was ever preserved, and it was transmitted by an unknown messenger and by a circuitous route.

4. An order of the *second* class is based on the assumption that the recipient is familiar with his duties and that he has sufficient military ability to use the advantage of being on the ground. In newly formed armies this fortunate state of affairs can not exist, and consequently generals have gone to the *opposite extreme* in regulating details, so that field orders are often used as a vehicle to convey instruction to untrained subordinates, a purpose for which *general* orders can always be used.

II.—WHAT THE ORDER SHOULD NOT CONTAIN.

1. Explanations, apologies and guesses are signs of weakness in a commander. Interference with subordinates is inadvisable, because they have as good opportunities for seeing as their superiors and must be supposed to know their own duties best.

2. Provisions for a retreat should never be made in an order for an advance, as it is unwise to anticipate defeat in an order which should contemplate victory only. Arrangements for a possible retreat, under such circumstances, should be communicated to high-ranking commanders of independent units only, and always confidentially.

3. No attempt should be made to provide for events that may never occur and which no man can foresee.

4. Such words as "before," "behind," "forward," "rear," "this side," "that side," "great," "little," should never be used in a manner that would admit of an ambiguous meaning. Wherever they can be given with reference to well-known points, the compass bearings afford a more accurate method of designating the location or direction of positions, places, and forces, as "Woods, 600 yards S. of Kennedy's."

The terms "right" and "left" should not be applied to inanimate objects. They may refer to individuals or bodies of men, or to the bank of a stream, in which case the observer is supposed to be facing down stream.

5. Such modifying expressions as "as far as possible," "as well as you can," "attempt to capture," "try to hold," should be avoided. Such expressions tend to divide the responsibility between the commander and his subordinates instead of placing it where it belongs. Weak and incompetent commanders will often deliberately choose a form of expression that can be interpreted in several ways, because they do not themselves know what they want and because they see a chance to shift the responsibility in case of failure. Such action points out a man as unfit for command. Responsibility should be boldly assumed and placed where it belongs.

6. All requirements or instructions not directly concerned with the movement at hand should be included in the *general* or *special* series of orders. Such provisions should never be incorporated in *Field Orders*. The practice of mixing up orders for every conceivable detail in service with orders for the movement of troops should be most carefully avoided.

III.—THE MOST IMPORTANT REQUISITES.

1. The order in the field is issued under peculiar conditions of emergency and inconvenience. It is received sometimes in the midst of great excitement and danger. Perhaps it must be read in a storm where no shelter is near or at night by a poor light. It must therefore be brief, in short sentences, and clearly expressed.

2. It has been well said that an order which can possibly be misunderstood will infallibly *be* misunderstood. On one occasion General Sedgwick was asked why he kept a rather dull officer on his staff. The General said, "X is very useful to me. Whenever I issue an order I read it to him first, and if he can understand it I know that anyone can."

3. A positive and not a negative form of expression should be used. Such an order as "The baggage will not accompany the command" is defective, because the gist of the order depends upon a single word.

4. The writing must be so distinct and clear as to be legible even in a poor light. By resorting to a vertical style of writing the legibility of many writers is greatly improved. In most armies this is a very important matter, and an officer *who can not write legibly, whatever may be his other qualifications*, is in a measure unfitted for the duties of a staff officer in the field.

IV.—THE FORM OF THE ORDER.

1. There are good reasons for adopting an almost invariable model for field orders. In this way information may be so grouped that the eye will instantly detect any omission. Although it is permitted to officers of long experience to depart from any models, it is found best to prescribe a form for beginners. It is also found that officers who have once been instructed in this way will, even after long experience, closely follow the accepted model.

2. Let us suppose that the First Army Corps, encamped at Winchester, Kans., has a detachment encamped at Easton, Kans.; that this detachment is ordered to proceed to Fort Leavenworth and seize the bridge over the Missouri River at that place. We will

suppose that the enemy has been seen, at 1 p. m. to-day, in camp on the Platte River in Missouri, a day's march east of Fort Leavenworth. Suppose that the detachment consists of a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, a battery of field artillery, a half company of engineers, and a detachment of an ambulance section.

The order of the detachment commander would then take the following form:

(Type-written form. See also Appendix I.)

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

Hq. Det. 1st Div., 1st Army Corps,
Camp at Easton, Kans.,
19 Sept 05, 3 p.m.

TROOPS.

- (a) Independent Cavalry:

Maj. A.

1st Sq. 5th Cav.

- (b) Advance Guard:

Maj. B.

4 troopers 1st Sq.

5th Cav.

1st Bn. 6th Inf.

1 plat. Co. A, 1st
Bn. Engrs.

- (c) Main Body (in order of march):

1 n. c. o. & 8 troopers
1st Sq. 5th
Cav.

Hq. & 2d Bn. 6th
Inf.

1st Btry. F. A.

3d Bn. 6th Inf.

Det. amb. sec. 1st
F. Hosp.

1. Cavalry patrols of the enemy have been seen east of the MISSOURI river. His infantry and artillery are reported one day's march east of FORT LEAVENWORTH. Our main body is at WINCHESTER, 8 miles west of EASTON.

2. The detachment will march to-morrow toward FORT LEAVENWORTH.

3. (a) The independent cavalry will start at 5.30 a. m., and will cover the movement. It will seize the bridge over the MISSOURI river and will send patrols to the eastward.

(b) The advance guard will precede the main body at a distance of 800 yards.

(c) The main body will march at 6 a. m. from the eastern exit of EASTON, by the EASTON—FRENCHMAN—FORT LEAVENWORTH road.

4. The regimental train, escorted by six troopers, will follow as far as FRENCHMAN.

5. The detachment commander will be with the main body until 7 a. m., and after that with the advance guard.

By order of Colonel C:

F——— D———,

Capt. & Adj. 6th Inf.

Dictated to adjutants, battery commander, commander of engineers, and staff. Copy to division commander by Lieut. E.

V.—THE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE ORDER.

1. *The caption* is the heading of the order and consists of the official designation of the issuing officer's command, the place, the date, often the hour and minute of issue, the kind of series, and the number of the order.

2. *The margin*, headed "Troops," is used in certain orders. It occupies from one-third to one-half of the page, on the left, and contains a statement of the component parts of the command, as well as its subdivision into fractions for information, protection, and various missions. When no marginal distribution of troops is needed the order is written entirely across the page.

3. *The body of the order* is divided into numbered paragraphs without headings.

Paragraph 1 contains information of the enemy and so much of the general situation of our own troops as it is desirable for subordinates to know.

Paragraph 2 contains the objective of the movement or instructions covering as much of the general plan as is considered necessary to insure proper cooperation in the movements of all parts of the command.

Paragraph 3 contains the disposition of the troops adopted by the commander to carry out the second paragraph, including the tasks assigned to each of the several fractions of the command.

Paragraph 4, with few exceptions, contains all the orders necessary for the regimental train, ammunition columns, and sanitary troops.

Paragraph 5, with few exceptions, contains the necessary information as to the place where the commander can be found or where messages may be sent.

4. *The ending* contains the authentication of the order by an appropriate signature, and a statement showing how the order is communicated to the troops.

In considering the details of the preparation of each of these subdivisions numerous principles are involved.

CAPTION.

1. In that part of *the caption* above the date, the issuing officer's command should always be stated; for example:

Hq. Det. 1st Div., 1st Army Corps, Camp at Easton, Kans.,
as in the order under discussion.

Outpost, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Advance guard, 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, Fort Leavenworth,
Kans.

Detachment, 1st Division, 1st Army Corps, Fort Leavenworth,
Kans.

Headquarters 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Corps, Army of
the Cumberland.

Such designations, with numbers and dates, serve to fully identify orders. The word "headquarters" is not used in connection with posts or permanent camps, or with outposts, advance guards, rear guards, or with tactical units and detachments smaller than a regiment.

A "detachment" is defined as a body of troops separated from a higher unit or command and intrusted with a special mission. It may vary in size from a squad to a division, and may be composed of one kind of troops or of troops from two or more of the combatant arms; and the components may be taken from one or from several higher units.

The title may be stated in the order organizing the detachment, or a suitable title may be evolved in the course of service from its destination or the nature of the duties upon which it is engaged; for example: "China Relief Expedition," "Ute Expedition."

The detachment may be composed principally of one complete unit, with smaller units of any of the combatant arms attached for special reasons; or it may contain no predominating unit of any arm. In the former case, where the auxiliary forces do not exceed the proportion stated in the organization of a division, or where the smaller bodies do not form tactical units, the caption of the command would be that of the predominating unit; in the latter case the word "detachment" would be used in connection with the title of the higher unit from which the force was taken; for example, "Detachment, 1st Division, 8th Army Corps."

2. In foreign service dates are often abbreviated, as 9-1-04, indicating the 9th day of the first month of the year 1904, but in our service the usual abbreviation is 8 Jan 04. In naming a night, both days should be mentioned, thus: "night 19/20 September." The

words "noon" and "midnight" should be written. The hour and minute when the order is signed should be given after the date.

3. The character of the order and its serial number are then stated. In the United States the term "Field Orders" is used to include what is elsewhere embraced in several classes of orders, such as Advance Guard Orders, Detachment Orders, Division Orders, etc.

MARGIN.

1. *The margin* is that part of the order which is first considered in its preparation and should be carefully tested to see that every part of the command has been accounted for. It is divided into paragraphs corresponding to the important parts of the command, as "independent cavalry," "advance guard," etc.

2. In naming tactical organizations it is important to follow a uniform rule. For this purpose certain forms of expression are selected and retained, so that there may be no possibility of mistake. The exact portion present of an organization is noted without mentioning parts that may be absent.

Complete organizations will be designated thus:

- Co. A, 1st Inf.
- 1st Bn. 2d Inf.
- 3d Infantry.
- Tr. B, 1st Cav.
- 2d Sq. 5th Cav.
- 6th Cavalry.
- 22d Btry. F. A.
- Co. E, 2d Bn. Engrs.
- 1st F. Hosp.

Fractions of organizations will be designated thus:

- 1 plat. Co. A, 1st Inf.; or 1st plat. Co. A, 1st Inf.
- Hq. & 2 Sqs. 9th Cav.; or Hq. & 1st & 3d Sq. 9th Cav.
- Hq. & 6 Cos. 9th Inf.; or Hq. & 1st Bn. & 2 Cos. 3d Bn. 10th Inf.
- 1 sec. Co. B, 1st Bn. Engrs.; or 1st sec. Co. B, 1st Bn. Engrs.
- 1 squad Tr. H, 8th Cav.
- 3 secs. Co. B, 16th Inf.
- Det. Sig. Corps.
- Amb. sec. 1st F. Hosp.; Hosp. sec. 3d F. Hosp.
- Det. amb. sec. 2d. F. Hosp.

3. In the advance guard in the example under discussion, it is to be observed that the first battalion of the infantry regiment is mentioned by name, while the two remaining battalions are marching in the main body. Ordinarily this detachment would be made by the colonel of the regiment, who in this case commands the entire force and consequently designates the advance guard battalion by name. If, however, a general officer were commanding, he would usually leave such a matter of detail to the colonel, and the order would read "one battalion" and not "1st battalion." This principle is followed throughout all grades of command, the rule being that it is unwise to interfere with the initiative of subordinates in matters concerning which the latter have the best information.

4. An important consideration is to preserve the integrity of the tactical units as far as possible. On this account a battalion of infantry was selected as advance guard, notwithstanding it might have been a trifle too large or too small. It would, for instance, be unusual to put three or five companies in an advance guard.

5. Engineers were assigned to the advance guard in order that they might be available for work at an early moment.

6. Hospital corps units are usually assigned to the rear of the main body, but in expectation of an action a proper proportion would march with the advance guard.

7. The name of the commander of each fraction should be given; but is usually omitted in the case of the main body, because the commander of the whole force habitually rides at the head of the main body and conducts its movements.

8. Artillery is placed sufficiently far to the rear to insure its safety in case of sudden attack. There are many positions affording cover for the enemy's infantry along the line of march and the opportunities for the use of artillery are few until open country is reached. When an enemy is encountered it is better to engage him at a distance than to place the artillery in danger from his skirmishers.

BODY OF THE ORDER.

PARAGRAPH 1.

1. A large number of reconnaissance reports were received, some widely conflicting, others vague and improbable. On receiving orders "to proceed to Fort Leavenworth and seize the bridge over the Missouri River at that place," one of the commander's first duties was to sift these reports and to formulate a statement so brief,

so plain, and so well substantiated as to give the clearest idea he could of the strength, position, and intentions of the enemy. Having formulated a statement giving all the reliable information in his possession, he incorporated it, where it belonged, in the first paragraph of the order.

2. It is reasonable to infer that the enemy is advancing on Fort Leavenworth, because his cavalry is between his main body and that place. A considerable force is indicated by the presence of artillery with his infantry. He was seen at 1 p. m. to-day encamped on the Platte River, and from the hour of the day and the distance, and the fact that there are no good camping places between the Platte and Missouri rivers, it is safe to conclude that he will not march on Fort Leavenworth before to-morrow.

3. Even when the commander, lacking satisfactory reports, or accurate knowledge, is unable to give definite information of the enemy, a statement of what seems to him most probable, based on the best information he has, deserves a place in the order, but it should be stated only as a belief or probability and not as a positive fact.

4. If he had no definite knowledge, the information concerning the enemy might, for instance, have been stated in some such form as this: "From reports received it seems probable that the enemy intends such a move" or "The enemy appears to be in such a position." Such conclusions, to be of value, must be based on a system of reports, which requires a free communication with all the fractions of a command and an efficient service of information.

5. It may sometimes happen that a subordinate has no other information of the enemy than that conveyed in instructions received from superior authority. In such cases, the first paragraph of the order may contain information of the enemy in the exact language of his instructions.

6. It is a remarkable fact that information concerning the enemy was omitted from some of the most important orders of the Civil War, which perhaps may justify the conclusion that scouting and reconnaissance were too often defective, and also that the absence of good maps and the peculiar character of the theater of operations made it impossible to locate the enemy until he was actually encountered.

PARAGRAPH 2.

7. The provisions of paragraph 2 alone convey little knowledge; but when read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, the subordinate is able to gather a sufficient idea of the general plan to use his judgment intelligently.

8. It has already been indicated, and will be further explained below, why it is unwise to include too much detail of plans in orders, but it is essential to disclose sufficient to enable subordinates to conduct themselves intelligently. Otherwise they might jeopardize the success of plans by slavish and unintelligent adherence to inappropriate orders—orders, for example, which had been based on incorrect information of the enemy. Under such circumstances subordinates are justified in using their discretion in obeying the most positive order; that is to say, when it has become *perfectly evident* that the order has been based on erroneous ideas as to the strength, position, movements, or intentions of the enemy.

9. One of the points of contention in the Fitz-John Porter case was that the orders of General Pope were based on an erroneous idea of the position of Longstreet's corps, and the claim was made that Porter performed a decidedly meritorious act in failing to obey the order. At the battle of Woerth the Crown Prince, who was not on the field, and consequently not familiar with the exact state of affairs, gave orders to break off the action, but his orders were not carried out, because the commanders on the field thought that the action had progressed so far as to make such a thing inadvisable.

10. As to special instructions received, it is best to keep them out of the written order, although good reasons can be given for including them. The general rule is to communicate only so much as may enable subordinates to carry out the operations in hand. In this case the commander has simply given a general direction to the march, and is thus able to discount the effect of any failure or change of plans. Nevertheless, he may have consulted with the engineer officer with regard to the special work of his detachment and with the cavalry commander with regard to the distance and extent of his operations which would be beyond the commander's immediate supervision. Otherwise no subordinate, except the staff, need be informed of the instructions or intentions.

11. It would have been unwise to give any detailed plans for operations at the bridge itself. This takes into account matters that can only be settled after arrival on the ground. In many cases the best-formed plans may have to be modified; and it is not certain that the river can be reached without an engagement. An attempt

to prescribe beforehand what the troops shall do at that time is looking too far into the future. There are many conditions subject to rapid change; and should the enemy be fortunate enough to discover the commander's purpose he will be able to resort to measures especially designed to interfere with dispositions prematurely ordered for its execution.

12. Although instructions point out in this case the single objective of the bridge, orders might have been received covering several alternatives and detailing movements for several days. No mention should be made of such features of the instructions.

13. The best road should be used, even if somewhat longer. On a highway troops can march in column of squads or fours, while on side roads they would probably be limited to a column of twos. Highroads would also probably be in better repair; on country roads one is more likely to find bad places, which delay the march. Reasons for using a number of roads apply to a large command and not to a small column like this. (See paragraph 3, p. 12.)

14. The several fractions of the command under this paragraph are treated under lettered subheads, as (a), (b), etc. In an order for an attack it is customary to put the most important dispositions first; in an order for a march troops are named according to the position they occupy in column.

(a)

15. Regarding the use of cavalry, it may be stated in general terms that as much cavalry as possible should be actively employed. Under this rule nearly all the cavalry should be placed between the command and *the enemy*, whenever the ground admits of its use.

16. It is easy to imagine conditions where cavalry would be placed in rear of the column, as in *mountainous country*. In such a case, where it is expected to enter an open country very soon, a part of the cavalry might be at the rear of the infantry of the advance guard.

17. In the present case there is a comparatively *open country* where cavalry may be used either as a part of the advance guard or independently. There are good reasons for both. A relatively weak force of cavalry could not be given much independence of action. If an engagement is imminent the cavalry would not be sent far away.

18. Here there is a considerable force, and it should be used independently for the following reasons: It should not be tied to the infantry, because its rate of march is greater and it would gain con-

siderably in a march of this length. If the cavalry is given to the advance guard commander that officer would be inclined to use it in the restricted service of securing the safety of the column and not in the broader and more appropriate duty of reconnaissance. When the independent cavalry meets the hostile cavalry, it can maneuver so as to engage the latter to the best advantage, because neither the direction of its advance nor of its retreat is obligatory, not being tied to the advance guard or to its commander.

For instance, suppose a squadron of the enemy should appear in the direction of Kickapoo, the independent cavalry commander would be free to concentrate and attack it, while if tied to the command he could not do so. In addition to the above, the cavalry commander gets his orders direct, without having them filtered through the minds of intermediate commanders, and the advance guard commander knows that he must take measures for the protection of the column, without assistance from the cavalry, being thus thrown on his mettle at all times.

19. Small detachments are, however, made from the cavalry for various purposes. These details should be confined to the smallest limits possible, in order to save the cavalry from one of the worst abuses. The following would be sufficient: For maintaining order in the train, a few troopers whose horses were not in good condition could be detailed by the cavalry commander; for the advance guard, 4 troopers; as orderlies, a noncommissioned officer and 8 troopers.

(b)

20. Ordinarily each officer would regulate his distances according to circumstances. In this case the commander was supposed to command the main body and designated an hour for starting. Although it is strictly a part of the duty of the advance guard to take its proper position, it is not unusual to prescribe the distance at which it would precede the main body. In fixing the distance a wide latitude is permitted, owing to the great variety of circumstances and conditions which may be soon encountered. The country in this case is full of defensive positions where a small force could delay another for a long time. If the main body is 800 yards in rear of the advance guard, an order could be sent to the rear and the artillery could be brought up at a trot in ten minutes, or the leading companies of the main body could be brought up in about the same time. These considerations led to the use of that distance in this particular case.

(c)

21. It is not sufficient to prescribe that the command will start at a certain hour. The troops would be camped over a considerable area, depending upon the size of the force. Before marching, it is necessary for them to get into the proper order of march, but as it is always desirable to avoid wasting time it is not usual to consume any in regularly forming the column in a formal manner. If all marched at the same moment, however, some would be too late and others too early to fall into the column in proper order. To avoid delay and confusion, it is customary to designate an "Initial point" or place at which the various subdivisions of the command will arrive at proper times and join the column. This point might be given as the point of departure of the advance guard, in which case the main body would have its distance given, or it might be the point at which the head of the main body would start, in which case the orders should state the distance at which the advance guard would precede the main body. The various fractions of the command can then calculate the time when it will be necessary to leave their camps or bivouacs in order to take their proper positions and follow promptly as the column forms while marching away.

22. To afford sufficient room for all parts of the command, it is generally advisable to designate an initial point a short distance in advance of the main part of the camp or bivouac. In this order the "Initial point" is the eastern exit of Easton, which the head of the main body is supposed to leave at 6 a. m.

23. The duties of the several fractions of the command are not specified in detail. They are merely given a general direction in order that subsequent developments may shape themselves. Commanders of advance guard and cavalry are not told how to march their commands. The order of march of the main body is given and the name of its commander is omitted for reasons already stated. All other details are left to the subordinate commanders.

PARAGRAPH 4.

24. In considering the disposition of the train numerous alternatives are presented. It may follow the main body; it may move with trains of the entire army; it may remain at Easton; it may follow to a certain point and stop there to await orders.

25. The last disposition seems to be the best. The train is ordered to "Frenchman," where it may be held at the crossroads ready to march in any direction. It is near enough to receive orders quickly.

It will not be in the way in case of defeat. It can join the command easily, when sent for, at the camp for the night. Its location points to a general principle for the disposition of a large train.

26. As far as guarding the train is concerned, a detail is made to preserve order only. There is usually a sufficient number of men with the train to protect it against any small enterprises of the enemy.

•
PARAGRAPH 5.

27. Under ordinary conditions the commander rides out to the front. His object in going there is to form an estimate of the situation and not to interfere with the commander of the advance guard, to make plans in good time, and to send orders to the rear. Ordinarily he would not ride with the advance cavalry and it would not be necessary for him to start out with the advance guard. It would be better for him to remain at Easton until all the troops have left. It is a good idea for a commander to see his command march by him each day, after the manner of an informal review. For these reasons the last paragraph was written as it is.

ENDING.

The order should be authenticated by the signature of the officer in command, or his chief of staff, or by some other authorized staff officer. The method of issue is noted across the page below the signature, showing how the orders were issued and to whom the copies have been furnished. When sent by messenger his name should be given.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. Ordinary abbreviations are used in the caption, margin and ending, but no abbreviations whatever should be made in the body of the order except a. m. and p. m. for morning and afternoon. Abbreviations of tactical units and arms of the service should begin with capital letters. Each organization should be definitely described by its designation in the organization of the Army.

2. A road is always designated by naming several places along its line, such as the LEAVENWORTH—LOWEMONT—ATCHISON road.

3. It is very important that the names of persons and places should be correctly understood when they appear in the body of an order. For this reason it is advisable to emphasize geographical names by inserting them in CAPITALS. When writing orders by

hand such names should be printed out in capitals, in order to guard against indistinct or illegible handwriting. It will often be a useful precaution to give in parenthesis, immediately following them, the phonetic spelling of the local pronunciation of proper names; for example, DUQUESNE (Dewkane), SAULT (Soo), OPEQUON (Opeckan). Such a simple word as Antietam has been mistaken for Anty Tam.

4. A standard map is usually furnished by the general staff. In case names are used which are not on the map in general use, a reference should be made to the map on which they are to be found. When several names are alike in a neighborhood they must be located by reference to other points. Thus in the Atlanta campaign there were two places designated as Howell's Mills, one on Peach Tree Creek and the other on Nancy's Creek, about 2 miles apart. A misunderstanding as to these points caused a wide gap in General Sherman's lines closing on Atlanta, which might have caused serious results.

5. No provision was made in this order for guarding the flanks, as the cavalry could be counted upon to attend to this. Though there be several parallel roads, a command of this size can protect its flanks better by keeping together than by making detachments.

6. When we begin to consider the distances which would be occupied on the road by this command, disposed in the usual manner, and find how great they are in comparison with the actual length of the column closed up, the question naturally occurs whether this is not a case where one of the subdivisions of the advance guard may be dispensed with. As we decrease the size of an advance guard it is evident that we will sooner or later reach such a case. In this instance it might appear that the safety of the command would be better secured by leaving out the reserve of the advance guard, but this is a matter for the advance guard commander to decide, and it was therefore omitted from the order.

7. The question of the necessity for a rear guard naturally arises. In a forward march the duties of a rear guard are usually insignificant, and as the train was disposed of by halting it at Frenchman it is thought that a detachment for the purpose of guarding it was not necessary.

8. Peculiar and exceptional circumstances might possibly arise justifying the prescribing in orders, especially with small commands, the amounts of ammunition, rations, and forage to be carried, but in well-regulated, well-instructed, experienced commands all such provisions would ordinarily be omitted from orders for the movement of troops. Similarly, all matters pertaining to the domain of

drill, instruction, and discipline would be excluded. Whenever it becomes necessary, all such matters can be covered in verbal instructions, or preferably in separate orders (general or special), circulars, or letters of instruction.

9. It should be borne in mind that ordinary exertions of troops are alone considered in this order. In the usual course of events the command would not be expected to march before morning. Night marches are exceptional, are not easily executed, and take more time than marches by day. They are never made except for specific reasons or purposes. The time of starting is therefore fixed at 6 a. m., when it is broad daylight.

10. An important point for all commanders to bear in mind in the preparation of orders is that the situation must be accepted as it is prescribed in their instructions from superior authority. Whether the view of the situation, which has evidently inspired the instructions received, is logical or not, is hardly a question to be worried about by a right-minded subordinate. He must also try to avoid conjuring up difficulties outside of the situation which is placed before him. He should think of his own obligations alone and not bother about those properly resting upon others. These peculiarities were so highly developed in an otherwise excellent corps commander as to cause General Grant to justify his being relieved on the field.

INFORMATION, MESSAGES, REPORTS, WAR DIARIES.

1. Closely connected with the subject of orders is that of information of the enemy, because upon this depends the correctness of the whole. This information may be obtained from a variety of sources, among which would be higher authority, neighboring troops, spies, but principally the reports of small parties which send in their observations from many points at the same time. These advanced detachments have the double duty of collecting information and transmitting it promptly. It is with the latter subject we are principally interested now, because the entire work is valueless unless the information is quickly and accurately transmitted to the highest authority. It is sent in the form of messages written on regulation blanks, which are folded once and fit envelopes which are provided. (See Appendix II.)

2. The address is written briefly, as

COMMANDING GENERAL,
1st Army Corps.

The sender fills in the hour and minute of dispatch and indicates the rate of travel. "Ordinary" means about 5 miles an hour for a mounted man; "Rapid" requires principally trot, 7 to 8 miles per hour; "Urgent" requires the highest speed consistent with safety and certainty of arrival at destination—depending upon the distance.

It is usual to leave the envelope open in order that commanders along the line of the messenger's route may read the contents. If desirable that the contents be unknown, the envelope should be sealed and marked "Confidential."

The receiver fills in the time of receipt and returns the envelope to the messenger.

3. In the message blank, the heading "Sending detachment" should be filled in with the name of the body of troops with which the writer is on duty, as "Picket, Co. A, 20th Inf.," or "Officers' Patrol, 7th Cav."

If several messages are sent during the day from the same source to the same person they should be numbered consecutively below the heading "Sending detachment."

A message which does not give the place and hour is usually of no value. The signature should simply be the writer's surname and rank.

For the use of staff officers, blocks with carbonized paper are recommended.

4. The *message* or *dispatch* resembles a telegram in its clearness and brevity and in the absence of official formalities.

5. The utmost care should be observed in its preparation, remembering that *facts* are wanted and that they must be clearly separated from what has been surmised or received at second hand. The source of information should be given and the reason for surmises.

6. Most of the rules adopted to secure clearness and brevity of orders apply to *messages*.

7. Remembering the importance of an exact knowledge of the situation, it is the duty of those who are charged with reconnaissance work to report frequently and fully. As these *messages* from many points are to be considered as a whole it will frequently be as important to report where the enemy is *not* as where he is, whether the aspect changes or remains the same, whether previous information is confirmed or not. The accurate statements of numbers, time, and place are valuable. The arms of the service observed will be the basis for important deductions as to the size and intentions of a force. For instance, the information that infantry was in front was sufficient to stop the last advance of Lee at Appomattox, because Lee then knew that he was no longer opposed by a delaying force of cavalry, and that if a small body of infantry could get there the probabilities were that a large force of the same arm was at hand. Exact information as to what troops of the enemy have been seen will permit a commander who has studied the organization of the enemy to make deductions as to the distribution of forces and the numbers in his front.

If a subordinate is well informed of the intentions of his superiors he will be better able to select the class of information that is needed.

Too much information should not be forwarded and great care should be observed in deciding upon what is really important. A message which explains the situation clearly, and enables a conclusive decision to be reached is what is wanted. Meckel says that "a consciousness of duty well done is the best guaranty for the contents of a message or report."

The fight itself gives the best opportunity for judging the situation. The commander must therefore be kept continually informed by messages from the troops engaged. This was so persistently ignored during the Civil War that General Grant concluded that it was

impossible to secure information in the ordinary way, so he was in the habit of sending staff officers with details of orderlies to important points with orders to keep him informed. Napoleon kept a number of his best young generals at his headquarters for similar duties, and each was provided with a dozen horses.

8. In urgent cases it is necessary to send information not only to the next superior, but also to higher commanders, as well as to neighboring troops. A message sent thus to several authorities should have the fact noted upon each copy sent. An omission to send a message to the ordinary recipient should be repaired and explained at the earliest possible moment.

9. The back of the *message* blank is ruled in squares, so that it may be used to make a simple sketch of positions, roads, or other features of importance. The sketch gives a graphic representation of things which it sometimes takes long to describe. It may not only save time but add to the clearness of a written report, even when it is defective in technical skill and roughly executed.

10. The field *message* is then a brief communication which passes from one part to another of an army in service. It is entirely different from the *report*, which is a more elaborate statement prepared at leisure, giving a complete narrative of a campaign, battle, or other important event. This distinction should be clearly defined, as it has not always been observed in our service. It has been customary to use the word *report* to cover both terms.

11. Many of our records are full of *reports* of overwhelming forces of the enemy, of uniform valor on the part of the writer, indiscriminate praise of subordinates and loud calls for reinforcements. This tendency to magnify the size of an enemy, to call a defeat a victory, and to award perfunctory praise is perhaps natural, but it is reprehensible in official communications. Such information is of course valueless to a commander who looks for the exact truth from his subordinates.

12. At the headquarters of each command a war *diary* is kept in which a complete record is made as soon as possible. At the main headquarters an officer is charged with this duty alone.

THE ISSUE AND TRANSMISSION OF ORDERS AND MESSAGES.

1. Orders may be issued either verbally or in writing. The difficulty of providing a large number of copies on short notice makes the latter method difficult to use in the field. When a definite hour can be fixed representatives of the different organizations

should be assembled, the orders dictated by a staff officer, and written out by those sent to receive them. Such an assembly may be made at the close of a day's march in the evening, and even in the morning just before starting out. The custom of Napoleon was to take his rest early in the night and to wake some time after midnight when most of the reports from distant points had been received, and to spend the balance of the night in visiting troops, reconnoitering, and issuing his orders for the day.

2. Verbal orders may be given directly or by messenger. They may be issued directly when the necessary officers to receive them can be assembled to hear them, in which case they should be dictated and written down *if of any length*. For simple details or a single service a verbal order may be reduced to a word of command.

3. The danger of issuing the verbal order directly has many examples in history. There are ten different versions of the verbal orders of Napoleon to Grouchy, when the latter was detached to pursue the Prussians in the Waterloo campaign.

At Shiloh Gen. Lewis Wallace was 6 miles away, and was personally ordered to hold himself in readiness to move to reinforce the main army. General Grant says that he sent him a verbal order to march by the road nearest the river. General Wallace says that the order he received was to join the right of the army. The marches and countermarches of the division in obeying the two versions of the order kept the command out of action on the first day, when its presence would have been decisive.

At Fair Oaks, in 1862, Gen. J. E. Johnston seems to have had a good opportunity to destroy a portion of McClellan's army. His orders to Longstreet and D. H. Hill, who were to make the main attack, were given verbally. General Johnston's own account of them is contradictory and he has left no record of what they were. It is certain, however, that Longstreet did not execute them as intended, that he took the wrong road, and that the lack of decisive results was due to this fact. Johnston's action was probably due to the realizing sense that he was himself to blame in not making himself understood.

The offensive movement of Hood's army on July 20 and 22, 1864, was discussed in conference, and no formal orders were issued. Hood, A. P. Stewart, G. W. Smith, and Featherston declare that the failure to get a decisive advantage on those occasions was due to Hardee's failure to obey or to understand his orders.

General Hood has claimed that General Cheatham, at Spring Hill, before the battle of Franklin, did not obey a positive verbal order to attack the Federals. General Cheatham has, with equal earnest-

ness, denied that such an order was ever given. Great events and several military reputations depended upon that small point.

4. Verbal orders to be delivered by messenger should be avoided as much as possible. In matters of importance they should be used only under urgent necessity. Bearing in mind that there is always a possibility of controversy as to their purport, such orders should not contain more than one well-determined point, as, "the division will march to the village of X." The bearer of a verbal order should repeat it correctly before going away.

5. Orders and messages are transmitted, when the person to whom they are addressed is not present, by messenger or by some of the methods employed by the Signal Corps.

6. Very much depends upon the correct and rapid expedition of orders, almost as much as upon their being well drawn up. Great disasters and difficulties may arise through false transmission or by a mistake that is of little importance in itself.


7. When the subject is important and the way insecure it is well to employ several means of transmittal.


In 1807 the capture of the officer charged with the orders to Bernadotte delayed the arrival of his corps two days, and kept him out of the battle of Eylau, which was indecisive for this reason. So often did this occur in Napoleon's campaigns that he sent almost all his orders in cypher by several routes.

In the advance from Beaumont in the Waterloo campaign the center column composed of half of the army was delayed several hours by the failure of the leading corps to move. Vandamme was without orders because the single officer who bore them had fallen on the way. This delay was one of the causes of the failure of the campaign, and is generally ascribed to the inexperience of Marshal Soult, who had replaced Berthier as chief of staff. The same carelessness characterized all the communications with Grouchy during the campaign, and was largely responsible for the wanderings of D'Erlon's corps between Ligny and Quatre Bras, which was another of the fatal mistakes of that time.

8. Copies of written orders are always sent to higher authority whenever they involve the carrying out of instructions or orders previously received from that source.

9. Rapid transmission, when the Signal Corps is not available, and when the distances are considerable, will be secured by small detachments placed as relays at proper intervals.





APPENDIX II.

Following are samples of the message blank and envelope:

Sending detach- ment.	Location.	Day.	Mo.	Time.
No. —	Received:			
To:		(5½ inches.)		

(6½ inches.)

To:	
Departure: Rate of speed:	Arrival:
This envelope will be returned to bearer.	

(8½ inches.)

(6 inches.)

APPENDIX III.

Following are models for some of the most common forms of orders.

NOTE.—An effort has been made throughout to show the importance of excluding details as far as possible from field orders. The simplicity of the case selected made it a fit example. In a model, however, which is designed to cover a general case, it is necessary to supply instructions in much more detail, as will be found in the following:

1.—ORDERS FOR A MOVEMENT TO THE FRONT.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
 No. —. } (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

TROOPS.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*
2. *Objective of the movement* (stated in general terms).
3. *Disposition of troops:*
 - (a) *Orders for the advance guard* [distance at which it should precede main body or place and time of departure (when not prescribed for main body instead), road, extent of security and information service to be required, any special mission].
 - (b) *Orders for the main body* (distance from advance guard or initial point and time of departure).
 - (c) *Orders for flank guard* (similar to (a) when required, especial attention being given to reconnaissance. When necessary indicate where the flank guard leaves the main column).
 - (d) *Orders for the outposts* (how they enter the column on being relieved).
4. *Orders for the regimental train* (escort, distance in rear and destination when different from that of main body).
5. *Place of commander* (or where to send reports).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

REMARKS.—If the cavalry is used independently, instead of being attached to the advance guard, it should appear at the beginning of paragraph (a) of the margin as follows: *Independent Cavalry* (name of commander and troops). Paragraph 3 (a) of the body of the order will then read:

“3 (a) *Orders for independent cavalry* (hour and place of departure, direction of march, extent of security and information service required, special mission).”

In this case sufficient cavalry would be attached to the advance guard to secure it from surprise.

Paragraph 3 (d) will be omitted in case it is not applicable.

A certain hour may be fixed for the main body to start, or the distance at which it is to follow the advance guard may be prescribed. In the latter case it is necessary to designate the time at which the advance guard shall start. A principle of minor tactics requires that the advance guard shall generally regulate its advance on the movements of the main body, and in small commands where there would be no difficulty in keeping contact with the main body, this rule usually governs. But when the advance guard is very large or moves a very considerable distance in advance of the main body (sometimes one day's march), the main body would regulate its progress on that of the advance guard.

Sometimes the main body and the advance guard start from different rendezvous, far apart and not in sight of each other. In such cases, and also when the advance guard is very large, it is better to arrange to start both the advance guard and the main body by prescribing a definite time of starting for each.

The two paragraphs regulating the movements of the advance guard and the main body should never be inconsistent.

“Train” is a general term which describes all the transportation attached directly to troops and differs in this from the “ammunition” or “supply column,” whose wagons are united into independent units. The “train” is divided into “light” and “regimental.” The former carries the essential requisites for battle and follows immediately after the troops to which it is attached. It consists of the authorized ammunition wagons, ambulances, and led horses, and may be temporarily augmented by wagons, carts, and pack animals carrying tools and material for immediate use. Usually it is not mentioned in the order. The latter (regimental train) consists of ration, baggage, and cook wagons, which are united in each division under an officer, and follow the troops at a greater or less distance and must be promptly distributed among the troops to

which they belong upon arrival at the camp or bivouac. At the beginning of an engagement the regimental train must be halted at once and faced to the rear.

2. ORDERS FOR A RETREAT.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
No. —. } (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

TROOPS.

(a) Advance Troops:

(Name of commander and troops).

(b) Main Body, in order of march (generally as follows):

Field hospital.

Engineers.

Infantry.

Artillery.

Infantry.

Cavalry.

(c) Rear Guard:

(Name of commander and troops; usually strong in cavalry, artillery, and machine guns).

(d) Right (or Left) Flank Guard:

(Name of commander and troops).

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*

2. *Mission of the command* (plan of the commander).

3. *Disposition of troops:*

(a) *Orders for the advance troops* (place and time of departure, road, special instructions. Preparations for destroying and obstructing road).

(b) *Orders for the main body* (place and time of departure).

(c) *Orders for the rear guard* (distance from main body, or place and time of departure, examination of side roads, special instructions).

(d) *Orders for the flank guard.* [Similar to (c)].

(e) *Orders for outposts* (how and when withdrawn and joined to column).

4. *Orders for the regimental train* (place and time of departure, road, and escort; usually well in advance).

5. *Place of command* (or where to send reports).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

REMARK.—In a retreat the terms "right flank" and "left flank" are used as if the detachment were facing the enemy. The com-

mander may either use the cavalry as "rear guard cavalry" under the orders of the commander of the rear guard, as in the case supposed, or he may keep it under his own control.

3.—ORDERS FOR AN ADVANCE GUARD.

FIELD ORDERS, } Official designation of issuing officer's command
 No. —. } (advance guard of such a command).
 (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

TROOPS.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*
 2. *Mission of the advance guard.*
 3. *Disposition of troops.*
 - (a) *Orders for the Advance Cavalry* (place and time of departure, road, service of security and information, special mission).
 - (b) *Orders for the vanguard* [similar to (a)].
 - (c) *Orders for the reserve* (distance from vanguard or the place and time of departure).
 - (d) *Orders for the flank guard* [similar to (a)].
 - (e) *Orders for the outpost* (how and when withdrawn and joined to column).
 4. *Orders for the regimental train.*
 5. *Place of commander* (or where to send reports).
 (Signature:) ——— ———.
- (a) *Advance Cavalry:*
 (Name of commander and troops).
- (b) *Vanguard:*
 (Name of commander and troops).
- (c) *Reserve, in order of march* (generally as follows):
 Cavalry.
 Infantry.
 Artillery.
 Infantry.
 Field hospital.
- (d) *Right (or Left) Flank Guard:*
 (Name of commander and troops).

Manner of communicating the order.

4.—ORDERS FOR A REAR GUARD.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
 No. —. } (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) —.

TROOPS.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*
- (a) *Reserve, in order of march (generally as follows):*
 2. *Mission of the rear guard.*
 3. *Disposition of troops.*
 - (a) *Orders for reserve (place and time of departure, places selected for defense, troops sent ahead, distance from main body not definitely prescribed).*
 - (b) *Orders for the support and rear party (place and time of departure, or distance from the reserve).*
 - (c) *Orders for rear guard cavalry (place and time of departure of support, special orders).*
 - (d) *Orders for flank guard (place and time of departure, road).*
 4. *Orders for the regimental train.*
 5. *Place of commander (or where to send reports).*
- (b) *Support and rear party:*
 - (Name of commander and troops).
- (c) *Rear Guard Cavalry:*
 - (Name of commander and troops).
- (d) *Right (or Left) Flank Guard:*
 - (Name of commander and troops).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

5.—ORDERS FOR ESTABLISHING OUTPOSTS.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
 No. —. } (Place) ———; (date) ———, (hour) —.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops; position of main body of command.*
2. *Plan of commander (to go into camp and establish outposts).*

3. (a) *Designation of outpost troops and outpost commander, indication of general line to be occupied by the outposts* (connection with other outposts when necessary).

(b) *Orders for the outpost troops* (division into sections when necessary, special instructions, conduct in case of attack).

(c) *Orders for troops not assigned to the outpost* (interior guards, places of assembly in case of attack).

4. *Orders for the regimental train* (whether it accompanies the outpost troops or not).

5. *Place of the commander, or where to send reports.*

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

6.—OUTPOST ORDERS FOR A FORCE OF ALL ARMS.

FIELD ORDERS,	}	Official designation of issuing officer's
No. —.		command (outpost of such a force).
		(Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops* (position of advance guard, main body, and neighboring outpost).

2. *Plan of the outpost commander* (the general location of the line to be occupied).

3. *Disposition of troops:*

(a) *Orders for the outpost cavalry* (contact with the enemy, line to be observed, roads to be specially watched, places to be examined or visited, detachments to be made for service elsewhere).

(b) *Orders for the supports* (troops, approximate positions, assignment to sections when necessary).

(c) *Orders for the reserve* (troops, position, interior guards, intrenchment, if necessary).

4. *Orders in case of attack.*

5. *Place of outpost commander* (usually with the reserve).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

REMARK.—It is usual for the outpost commander to issue two orders. The first order contains the most important measures to be taken at once; the second is given later, after inspection of the first dispositions. The first order would be the same for the entire line. The second can be replaced by a series of separate instructions, but these must be communicated to all parties to such extent that unity of action is assured along the whole line.

6A.—SECOND OUTPOST ORDERS FOR A FORCE OF ALL ARMS.

FIELD ORDERS, } Official designation of issuing officer's
 No. —. } command (outpost of such a force).
 (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

1. *Information of the enemy* (if anything additional is known).
2. *Plan of commander* (to hold present position or to make changes.)
3. *Disposition of troops:*

(a) *Orders for the outpost cavalry* (degree of readiness for action required, time of withdrawal from the front, camp for the night, time for resuming day positions).

(b) *Orders for the supports* (degree of readiness, time for occupation of night positions, routes for night patrols, communication with neighboring troops, time for reoccupation of day positions, examining posts).

(c) *Orders for the reserve* (degree of readiness, night dispositions, time to form under arms the following day).

4. *Intrenchments, barricades, etc.*

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

7.—ORDERS FOR AN ATTACK BY A COMMAND WHILE ON THE MARCH.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
 No. —. } (Place) ———, (date), ———, (hour) ———.

1. *Detailed information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*

2. *Plan of the commander* (usually indicating a flank to be attacked. The advance guard is now informed that its functions as such have ceased).

3. *Disposition of troops:*

(a) *Orders for the artillery* (first position, first target, generally the hostile artillery).

(b) *Orders for the infantry* (indicating the general means to be used in the secondary attack, specifically the direction and objective of the main attack, name of the officer charged with the main attack).

- (c) *Orders for the reserve* (giving troops and position).

(d) *Orders for the cavalry* (usually in force on one flank, while the opposite flank is covered by patrols).

4. { *Orders for the ammunition column and for the field hospital*
 (when early provision can be made).
 Orders for the regimental train.
5. *Place of the commander* (usually near the first position of the artillery).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

REMARK.—The distribution of troops is not given in the margin of this order, as it already appears in the order of march. Ordinarily the *distribution* of troops is shown in marching orders only, but it may be convenient to write in the margin a list of the troops employed.

8.—ORDERS FOR TAKING UP A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

FIELD ORDERS, } (Official designation of issuing officer's command).
 No. —. } (Place) ———, (date) ———, (hour) ———.

1. *Information of the enemy and of our supporting troops.*
2. *Plan of the commander* (position to be defended. Formal dissolution of the order of march).
3. *Disposition of troops:*
 - (a) *Orders for the artillery* (position, target, and amount of intrenching).
 - (b) *Orders for the infantry of the first line* (division of front into sections and assignment of troops, amount of intrenching).
 - (c) *Orders for the reserve* (troops, position).
 - (d) *Orders for the engineers* (defensive works, bridging to be done in the rear).
 - (e) *Orders for the cavalry* (usually covering the most exposed wing with the main force, patrols being principally employed on the other flank).
4. { *Orders for ammunition column and field hospital.*
 Orders for the regimental train.
5. *Place of the commander* (or where to send reports).

(Signature:) ——— ———.

Manner of communicating the order.

APPENDIX IV.

SOME CELEBRATED ORDERS.

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDER FOR THE MARCH OF THREE GREAT ARMIES.

HEADQUARTERS, SAARBRÜCKEN,
9 August, 8 p. m.

Reports received lead to the supposition that the enemy has withdrawn behind the Moselle or Seille.

All three armies will follow this movement. The 3d army takes the road SAARUNION-DIEUZE and those south; the 2d army the road ST. AVOLD-NOMENY and those south; the 1st army the road SAARLOUIS-BOULAY-LES-ETANGS and those south.

In order to cover the march the cavalry is to be sent forward to a considerable distance and is to be supported by advance guards thrown out well to the front so that, should the necessity arise, each army may have time to close up.

Any deviation from these lines of march will be ordered by His Majesty as the position or movements of the enemy may demand.

The 10th of August may be employed by the 1st and 2d armies in giving the troops rest or in placing them on the roads designated for them.

As the left wing can not reach the SAAR until the 12th, the corps of the right wing will have comparatively short marches.

VON MOLTKE.

A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ORDERS FOR AN ATTACK.

SOUTHERN EXIT FROM BRITZ,
11th September, 1880—8.45 p. m.

I intend to attack the enemy who has occupied Buckow.

1. The advance guard (13th Infantry Brigade) takes Buckow. It will cover with its cavalry the left wing of the Army Corps.

2. From the main body:

The 5th Infantry Division marches to the west of Buckow and thence marches on Marienfelde.

The 12th Infantry Brigade will be echeloned east of the advance guard to support its attack on Buckow.

3. The Cavalry Division passes to the west of Buckow to reconnoiter towards Lichtenrade and to cover the right flank of the Army Corps.

4. The trains remain at Britz.

5. The operations will commence at 9 o'clock.

6. Reports will reach me at the mill on the high-road south of Britz.

VON SCHWARTZHOFF,

General, Commanding 3rd Army Corps.

To move 200,000 men into the field of Gravelotte the following order was issued:

"According to reports received we can expect that the enemy will take up a defensive position on the plateau between Le Point du jour and Montigny la Grange.

"Four battalions of the enemy have advanced into the Bois des Genivaux. His Majesty is of opinion that it is advisable for the XII and Guard Corps to march off in the direction of Batilly so as to reach the enemy at St. Marie aux Chenes if he marches off to Briey, or to attack Amanvillers in case he remains on the heights. The attack should follow simultaneously:

"By the 7th Army Corps from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte.

"By the 9th Army Corps against the Bois des Genivaux and Verneville.

"By the left wing of the 2d Army from the north."

VON MOLTKE.

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